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CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
 
With the advancements of networking technologies and miniaturization of electronic devices, 
wireless sensor network (WSN) has become an emerging area of research in academic, industrial, 
and defense sectors. Different types of sensing technologies combined with processing power and 
wireless communication capability make sensor networks very lucrative for their abundant use in 
near future. However, many issues are yet to be solved before their full-scale practical 
implementations. Among all the research issues in WSN, security is one of the most challenging 
topics to deal with. The major hurdle of securing a WSN is imposed by the limited resources of 
the sensors participating in the network. Again, the reliance on wireless communication 
technology opens the door for various types of security threats and attacks. Considering the 
special features of this type of network, in this chapter we address the critical security issues in 
wireless sensor networks. We talk about cryptography, steganography, and other basics of 
network security and their applicability in WSN. We explore various types of threats and attacks 
against wireless sensor networks, possible countermeasures, mentionable works done so far, other 
research issues, etc. We also introduce the view of holistic security and future trends towards 
research in wireless sensor network security. 
 
In a nutshell, in this chapter we will learn about the following topics: 
 Basics of security in wireless sensor networks 
 Feasibility of applying various security approaches in WSN 
 Threats and attacks against wireless sensor networks 
 Key management issues 
 Secure routing in WSN 
 Holistic view of security in WSN 
 Future research issues and challenges 
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Security in Wireless Sensor Networks: Prospects, 
Challenges, and Future 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) offers a unique way of extracting data from hazardous 
geographical regions where human intervention is extremely difficult, the network is often 
unattended, and where a good level of security has to be maintained for each step of the 
network’s operation. Among all varieties of wireless networks, WSN is the type of network that 
demands high-level security as one of its core features. In practical terms, WSN is considered as a 
class of ad hoc networks which could be formed whenever needed and sometimes without a fixed 
infra-structure. We define a sensor network as a network consisting of a set of small sensor 
devices that are deployed in an ad hoc fashion to cooperate with each other for sensing certain 
physical phenomenon. Typically a WSN has one or more base stations (sometimes called as sink) 
and relatively a great number of tiny sensing devices.  
 
Various issues in WSN are still under investigation and most of them are yet to reach the desired 
standards. Over the past few decades, with the advancements of ad hoc networking technologies, 
the research works on WSN have also been benefited. However, because of the differences in the 
nature of works and constrained resources of the sensors, a lot of issues simply could not be 
solved with the solutions that are devised for traditional ad hoc networks. ‘Security in WSN’ is 
one of such issues that should be handled with special care.  
 
Security in wireless sensor network has a great number of challenges, ranging from the nature of 
wireless communications, constrained resources of the sensors, unknown topologies of the 
deployed networks, unattended environment where sensors might be susceptible to physical 
attacks, dense and large networks, etc [1], [2]. In fact, each of these issues leads to different 
research direction. Whenever we think about any feasible security scheme for WSNs, we focus on 
a specific aspect and often ignore the other associated threats. It is in reality impossible to deal 
with all the security threats with a single mechanism. Hence, our approach often is to choose the 
most apposite mechanism among all the available mechanisms, based on the situation at hand and 
the settings of the network. 
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From the high-level point of view, we consider the following six principles while considering 
security for any system. These are collectively known as the philosophy of mistrust: 
 Don’t talk to any one you don’t know 
 Accept nothing without a guarantee 
 Take everyone as an enemy until proved otherwise 
 Don’t trust your friend for long 
 Use well-tried solutions 
 Watch the ground you are standing on for cracks 
 
Maintaining all these principles at the same time requires a lot of computational, memory, and 
energy resources which could often not be afforded for a security solution for wireless sensor 
networks. Sometimes we have to consider the schemes simply based on trust, the well-established 
solutions for other networks are often extremely difficult to think of, and sometimes employing 
periodic renewal for any security component is not at all viable. All these points make the 
research works on security in WSN very interesting as well as very challenging. 
 
In this chapter, we present a detailed review of security in wireless sensor network considering all 
the challenges, prospects, and the futuristic views. As we will mainly focus on the ins and outs of 
security in WSN, other introductory aspects of sensor networks will not be discussed. Interested 
readers are suggested to go through [3] for a good survey on the basics of wireless sensor 
networks.  
 
We have started this chapter with a brief introduction of wireless sensor network, its 
characteristics, and the major challenges that it faces to get an efficient security solution. In the 
rest of this chapter, we will first learn about the key aspects to consider for WSN security, various 
security approaches, whether they are directly applicable for WSN or not, major threats and 
attacks in WSN, their detection, prevention, and countermeasures, key management issues, and 
secure routing issues. Before concluding the chapter, we will talk about holistic view of security 
and what we can expect in the near future for research on WSN security. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
Before an in-depth investigation of the security threats and attacks in wireless sensor networks, 
let us first have a look at the major aspects that make the issue of maintaining security so difficult 
for wireless sensor networks. 
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2.1. Key Aspects to Consider for WSN Security 
 
2.1.1. Constrained Resources of Sensors 
 
The sensors that build up the network are usually of inadequate memory, processing, and 
communication capabilities that cannot support the execution of large amount of codes. Their 
energy sources are also very limited. As an example, Crossbow MICA2 mote [4] is a well-known 
sensor node with an ATmega128L 8-bit processor at 8 MHz, 128KB program memory (flash), 
512KB additional data flash memory, 433, 868/916, or 310 MHz multi-channel radio transceiver, 
38.4 kpbs radio, 500-1000 feet outdoor range (depending on versions) with a size of only 58 x 32 
x 7 (mm). Usually it is run by TinyOS operating system and powered by 2 AA sized batteries. 
Hence, it is understandable that such a device with this configuration cannot support the security 
mechanisms that require executing huge amount of instructions. Again, usually a sensor network 
contains a large number of sensor nodes. The number of sensors in the network might directly 
affect the use of memory space of a particular node participating in the network. This is because 
the memory is frequently used to store pre-distributed secret keys or keying information or the 
codes to find out pairwise secret keys between any two nodes in the network. Node failure is 
another problem that could also affect the network severely. If a node is alive relatively longer 
than the other nodes in the network (say for performing huge calculations related to security), it 
might lose its energy rapidly and can be non-functional relatively earlier than the other less active 
nodes. 
 
2.1.2. Nature of Work of WSN 
 
Many applications of wireless sensor networks require deployment of sensors in remote, 
unattended, hostile, or hazardous areas. The sensors are often exposed to various types of 
adversaries and could be attacked physically. Even if they are deployed over a field, a passing 
vehicle can run over and physically damage them. An adversary can physically search and 
destroy the nodes [5]. Environmental conditions might also affect the performance of the sensors 
or can cause physical damage. All these unintentional or intentional events that can cause 
physical damage to a sensor are considered as physical security issues. Sometimes physical 
attacks (like capture or destruction of nodes) can also cause several types of logical security 
attacks. A good deployment or management policy, tamper-proofing mechanisms of the physical 
package of the sensors, camouflaging, protective shields, or other available techniques [6] could 
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be used for dealing with physical security threats in wireless sensor network. More discussions on 
these issues will be provided later in this chapter. 
 
2.1.3. Use of Wireless Communications 
 
Wireless technology is used for communications among the nodes in a wireless sensor network. 
Hence, similar to any other kind of wireless network, it is also prone to various types of threats 
related to the unreliable nature of wireless links like; undelivered packets, collisions of packets, 
latency, etc. Because of the broadcast nature of wireless channels, any adversary can even 
eavesdrop or passively listen to the transmissions of any legitimate node. In case of wired 
communication, the guided media could be well-protected by using various means and usually the 
end devices come with sufficient protective mechanisms. On the contrary, in case of wireless 
communication, because of its unguided medium and open nature, many new types of attacks 
could be launched. In fact, many of the security threats in WSN exist because of the use of 
wireless technology for communications among the nodes. 
 
2.2. Feasibility of Different Security Approaches in WSN 
 
Security is a broadly used term encompassing the characteristics of authentication, integrity, 
privacy, non-repudiation, and anti-playback [7]. Over the past few decades, the more the 
dependency on network-provided information has increased, the more the risk has increased for 
secure transmission of information over the networks. To ensure various aspects of security (i.e., 
authenticity, integrity, privacy, etc.), we use various approaches like cryptography, 
steganography, physical layer security, and so on. In this section, we will examine which of the 
major security approaches can be viable for wireless sensor networks. 
 
2.2.1. Cryptography 
 
Most of the encryption-decryption techniques devised for traditional wired networks are not fit 
for direct use in wireless networks. We know that WSNs consist of tiny low-cost devices which 
possess very scarce processing, memory, and battery power. Applying any kind of encryption 
scheme requires transmission of extra bits, and thus it needs extra processing, memory, and 
battery power which are very important resources for the sensors’ longevity. Applying the 
encryption and decryption operations can also increase delay, jitter, and packet loss in wireless 
sensor networks. Moreover, some critical questions arise when applying an encryption-decryption 
scheme to WSN like; how the keys should be generated, how the keys should be disseminated, 
how the keys should be managed, revoked, or assigned to a newly added sensor in the network, 
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and so on. As minimal (or no) human interaction is one of the fundamental features of WSN, it is 
also a crucial point to decide how the keys could be modified/refreshed time to time for 
encryption. Adoption of pre-loaded keys or embedded keys might always not be the best solution. 
Overall, the schemes that are based on cryptographic techniques must be lightweight so that the 
sensors can support them along with other mechanisms, which are running and sharing the same 
available resources in the tiny devices. 
 
2.2.2. Steganography 
 
While cryptography aims at hiding the content of a message, steganography [8], [9] aims at 
hiding the existence of the message. Steganography is the art of covert communication by 
embedding a message into the multimedia data (image, sound, video, etc.) [10]. The main 
objective of steganography is to modify the carrier in a way so that it is not perceptible and hence, 
looks just like ordinary. It hides the existence of the covert channel, and furthermore, if we want 
to send a secret data without sender information or want to distribute secret data publicly, it is 
very useful. However, securing wireless sensor networks is not directly related to steganography 
and processing multimedia data (like audio, video) with the inadequate resources of the sensors is 
difficult. Instead, it still remains as an open research issue. We might have to wait until the 
sensors acquire enough capabilities to support extensive computations associated with 
steganography. 
 
2.2.3. Physical Layer Secure Access 
 
Physical layer secure access in wireless sensor networks could be provided by using frequency 
hopping. A dynamic combination of the parameters like hopping set (available frequencies for 
hopping), dwell time (time interval per hop), and hopping pattern (the sequence in which the 
frequencies from the available hopping set is used) could be used with a little expense of 
memory, processing, and energy resources. Important point in physical layer secure access is the 
efficient design so that the hopping sequence is modified in less time than is required to discover 
it. One drawback for employing this is that both the sender and receiver should maintain a 
synchronized clock. Time synchronization in wireless sensor network [11] is another research 
issue that might relatively be easier or harder based on the application requirements at hand. 
 
Considering all the basic security approaches, lightweight cryptography related or logical or 
algorithmic schemes could be the best choice for WSN security. We must keep in mind that, the 
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higher is the level of security of a WSN, the higher is the amount of resources needed to support 
it. 
 
3. Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
Let us now investigate the security threats and attacks in wireless sensor networks. We can 
consider several factors for categorizing the attacks like; the approach of attack, target of the 
attack, position of attacker, role of attacker, etc. Overall, we can classify all of the known attacks 
into three basic types: 
 
Type I 
• Attacks on the Basic Mechanism (e.g., attacks against routing in the network) 
• Attacks on the Security Mechanisms (e.g., against cryptographic scheme or against key 
management scheme) 
 
Type II 
• Passive Attack – It typically means eavesdropping of data. In this case, the attacker 
passively listens to the transmitted data in the network and can use the collected 
information later for launching other types of attacks.   
• Active Attack – It means any type of direct attack caused by an adversary. The attacker 
actively participates in the collection, modification, and fabrication of data. Sometimes, 
the information collected by passive attacks can be used for active attacks. 
 
Type III 
• External Attack – In external attack, an outsider is involved. These attacks can cause 
denial of service (DoS) situation, congestion, propagation of wrong routing information, 
etc. Typically external attacks can be resisted using firewalls, encryption mechanisms, 
good security management policy, and other available techniques. 
• Internal Attack – Internal attack sometimes could be very harmful for the network as any 
node within the network works as an attacker in this case. Internal attack is performed by 
compromising node(s) in the network. Compromising a node means convincing a 
legitimate node to help the attacker or persuading a node in the network to work on 
behalf of the attacking entity. Often it is difficult to detect an internal attacker within the 
network which shows a legitimate identity. Various kinds of authentication schemes, 
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intrusion detection schemes, or membership verification schemes can be used for 
preventing internal attacks. 
 
Other than these basic categories of attacks, depending upon the working principles and attack 
methods, several attacks are given some formal names. Here, we will learn about all the known 
attacks in WSN with their major features and possible defense mechanisms. 
 
3.1. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
 
Strictly speaking, we consider any kind of attempt of an adversary to disrupt, subvert, or destroy 
the network as Denial of Service (DoS) attack. In reality, any kind of incident that diminishes or 
eliminates or hinders the normal activities of the network can cause a DoS situation. It means that 
any kinds of hardware failures, software bugs, resource exhaustion, environmental conditions, or 
any type of complicated interaction of these factors can cause DoS. Note that, DoS (Denial of 
Service) is basically a given formal name of a particular condition of the network but when it 
occurs as a result of an intentional attempt of an adversary, it is called DoS attack. In general, 
‘Denial of Service (DoS)’ is an umbrella term that can indicate many kinds of events in the 
network with the fact that the legitimate nodes are deprived of getting their expected legitimate 
services for some reasons (intentional attempts or unintentional incidents). 
 
DoS attacks can mainly be categorized into three types: 
(1) Consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources 
(2) Destruction or alteration of configuration information 
(3) Physical destruction or alteration of network resources 
 
Among these types of DoS attacks, the first one is the most significant for wireless sensor 
networks as the sensors in the network suffer from the lack of enough and renewable resources. 
Other than these basic types, layer wise categorization of DoS attacks can be done [12]. An 
attacker can choose different targets at different layers to stop proper functioning of legitimate 
nodes so that they cannot get the services they are entitled to. Though it is quite difficult to know 
whether any particular DoS situation is caused intentionally or unintentionally, there are some 
common prevention and detection methods for each of the DoS attacks.  
 
Let us now have a look at the layer wise DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks: 
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3.1.1. DoS Attacks in Physical Layer 
 
Jamming – Jamming means the deliberate interference with radio reception to deny a target's use 
of a communication channel. For single-frequency networks, it is simple and effective, causing 
the jammed node unable to communicate or coordinate with others in the network. Due to their 
very nature, wireless sensor networks are probably the category of wireless networks most 
vulnerable to “radio channel jamming”-based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [13]. Mainly two 
types of jamming could be possible; constant and sporadic. In case of constant jamming, attacker 
interferes with the signals of a legitimate node continuously for a certain period of time while in 
case of sporadic jamming, the attacker intermittently causes jamming. Sporadic jamming in the 
network is often more difficult to detect than detecting constant jamming. Some solutions to deal 
with jamming in WSN are proposed in [13], [14], and [15]. 
 
Tampering – Due to the unattended feature of wireless sensor networks, an attacker can 
physically damage/replace sensors, parts of computational and sensitive hardware, even can 
extract cryptographic keys to gain unrestricted access to higher communication layers. Tampering 
is actually any type of physical attack on sensors in the network. Success in tampering depends 
on: 
- how accurately and efficiently the designer considered the potential threats at design time  
- resources available for design, construction, and test  
- attacker’s cleverness and determination 
  
3.1.2. DoS Attacks in Link Layer 
 
Collision – Adversaries may only need to induce a collision in one octet of a transmission to 
disrupt even a relatively longer packet. As the resources of the sensors are scarce, such loss could 
be significant in many cases. Also it is a great hurdle for acquiring timely and accurate data from 
the sensors. Unfortunately, in wireless networks, detection of a collision with a node's own 
transmission is difficult. Standard collision avoidance mechanisms also cannot help as they are 
cooperative by nature. An attacker simply can ignore the avoidance protocol and transmit at the 
same time as the victim. One possible solution could be the use of error correction codes (ECC) 
but with the use of ECC, more processing and communication overheads are incurred in such 
resource-constrained networks. 
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Exhaustion – Battery exhaustion attack could be launched with repeated requests for using the 
channel. A naive link layer implementation could be a target for this type of attack. Feasible 
defense mechanisms against battery exhaustion caused by repeated transmissions could be the use 
of time division multiple access (TDMA) or rate limitation. Additional logics could also be 
developed to help these mechanisms. 
 
Unfairness – Unfairness is a weaker form of DoS attack. This threat may not entirely prevent 
legitimate access to the channel, but could degrade service for real time MAC protocols. In fact, 
ensuring fairness in WSN is often viewed as a separate research issue. Use of small frames might 
be helpful in this case. However this would also incur some framing overheads. 
 
3.1.3. DoS Attacks in Network Layer 
 
Neglect and Greed – If a node drops packets or denies transmitting legitimate packets or if a node 
is very greedy to give undue priority to its own messages, these could be considered as ‘neglect 
and greed’. Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol or the protocols that are based on DSR are 
especially vulnerable to this type of attack. Use of multipath routing or redundant message 
transmission could be the solutions for handling such attacks. However, for WSNs these solutions 
might not be feasible. Instead, use of some other routing mechanisms could help. 
 
Homing – Sometimes in wireless sensor networks, some nodes are given some special 
responsibilities like managing cryptographic keys, making gist of acquired data, maintaining a 
local group, etc. Often the adversaries are attracted to these leader nodes and try to eavesdrop on 
their activities. In case of homing attack, the adversaries try to hamper the normal functioning of 
such types of leader nodes within a WSN. Homing attack is especially dangerous for the location-
aware routing protocols which rely on geographic information. Different types of cryptographic 
schemes, algorithms, hiding management messages, etc. could be used for preventing homing 
attack. 
 
Misdirection – Misdirection means simply directing the legitimate packets to the wrong path. A 
malicious insider can cause misdirection of traffic. Egress filtering (in hierarchical routing 
protocols), authorization and monitoring, or any kind of intrusion detection scheme (IDS) [16] 
could be used to prevent this type of DoS attack.  
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Blackhole – Blackhole (or Sinkhole) attack itself is one of the major attacks in WSN. We will 
discuss this attack in detail later in this chapter. However, when this attack causes any sort of 
denial of service in the network, it is considered as a DoS attack in network layer. 
 
3.1.4. Transport Layer DoS Attacks 
 
Flooding – Protocols which must keep the states of both end-nodes are particularly vulnerable to 
this attack. It aims at memory exhaustion of the nodes by flooding of a great number of packets. 
Client puzzles or traceback mechanisms could be used to deal with such type of DoS attack. 
 
Desynchronization – This attack means forging of packets during transmission. Existing 
connection between two endpoints could be effectively disrupted by desynchronization. Any kind 
of authentication mechanism for the packets could be used to handle desynchronization attack. 
 
Other than these attacks, many other individually considered attacks like wormhole attack, hello 
flood attack, sybil attack etc. can also cause denial of service situation in the network. This is in 
fact true that, many of the methods of attacking and targets of attacks simply overlap with each 
other, but considering different circumstances, they are given different tags and names. It should 
be clear that, any sort of intentional attempt that causes any sort of denial of service situation in 
the network is considered as DoS attack. As we will examine all other attacks in the rest of the 
chapter, here we conclude this section with the names of the major types of DoS attacks only. 
 
3.2. Attacks on Information in Transit 
 
Basic task of the sensors is to monitor the changes of some specific parameters (like temperature, 
sound, magnetism, light level, etc.) and to report those to the base station. The readings from the 
sensors could be transmitted using various methods. But, while sending the readings, the packets 
may be altered, spoofed, or vanished on the way (this type of attack could also be considered as 
network layer DoS attack when it resists a valid node from getting its expected service). As 
wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping, any attacker can monitor the traffic flow 
and get into action to interrupt, intercept, modify, or fabricate packets. If the routing method does 
not have proper security measures, wrong information even can reach up to the base station and 
thus can influence the decision taken by the central authority. Such an event might be extremely 
dangerous for a military reconnaissance scenario which could lead to taking disastrous military 
decisions. As sensor nodes typically have short range of transmission and scarce resources, an 
attacker with adequate processing power and larger communication range can attack several 
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sensors at the same time to modify the actual information during transmission. Among several 
works, a good approach to tackle this and to filter out falsely injected data in sensor networks is 
presented in [88]. 
 
3.3. Sybil Attack 
 
Sometimes the sensors in a wireless sensor network might need to work together to accomplish a 
task, hence the management policy of the network can use distribution of subtasks and 
redundancy of information. In such a situation, a node can pretend to be more than one node at 
the same time using the identities of other legitimate nodes. This type of attack where a node 
forges the identities of more than one node is called a Sybil attack [17]. The malicious device’s 
additional identities are called the Sybil nodes. Sybil attack tries to degrade the integrity of data, 
level of security, and resource utilization that a distributed algorithm targets to achieve. This type 
of attack can be performed for downgrading the performances of distributed storage, routing 
mechanism, data aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation, and misbehavior detection 
mechanisms. A conceptual view of Sybil attack is shown in Figure 1. Basically, any peer-to-peer 
network (any kind of wireless ad hoc network) is vulnerable to Sybil attack. Newsome et al. [18] 
presented a taxonomy of sybil attacks in WSN based on three orthogonal dimensions. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual view of a Sybil Attack. The node with id s6 is pretending to be three nodes at the same time (s6, 
s7, and s8), the nodes s3 and s4 do not have direct contacts with s7 and s8, so s6 can pretend to them as it is s7 or s8. 
Here, additional ids of s6 are called the ‘Sybil nodes’ (s7 and s8) 
 
3.3.1. Dimension I 
 
Direct Communication – In this case, Sybil nodes directly communicate with the legitimate 
nodes. When a legitimate node sends message to a Sybil node, malicious device listens to the 
message. In the same way, messages sent from the Sybil nodes are actually sent from the 
malicious device. 
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Indirect Communication – In this case, the legitimate nodes cannot directly communicate with 
the Sybil nodes rather a malicious device convinces them that it can reach to the Sybil nodes. Any 
message sent by a legitimate node to a Sybil node is routed through the malicious node and it can 
eventually do anything (modification, fabrication, dropping, etc.) with the received messages.  
 
3.3.2. Dimension II 
 
Identities used for the Sybil nodes could be obtained in one of two ways: 
 
Fabricated Identities – Attacker can simply generate a fake identity supported by the network 
and perform Sybil attack. 
 
Stolen Identities – Attacker in this case steals the identities of the legitimate nodes and uses those 
for launching attacks. 
 
3.3.3. Dimension III 
 
The identities of the Sybil nodes could be used in two ways: 
 
Simultaneous – The malicious node or the attacker can pretend to have multiple identities at the 
same time (as shown in Figure 1).  
 
Non-simultaneous – The attacker can somehow obtain a large number of valid identities but, 
instead of using all the identities at the same time, it can use those one after another in different 
time slots. 
 
One advantage for WSN to face Sybil attack is that, it can have some sort of centralized entity 
(base station or cluster head) in the network. Hence, this attack could be prevented using efficient 
protocols. Douceur [17] showed that, without a logically centralized authority, sybil attacks are 
always possible except under extreme and unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and 
coordination among entities. However, detection of sybil nodes in a network is not so easy. Some 
of the recently proposed detection and prevention mechanisms could be found in [19], [20], [21], 
[22], and [90].  
 
3.4. Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack 
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Figure 2: Conceptual view of a Blackhole/Sinkhole Attack. The attacker advertises high quality link through it which 
tempts s3, s4, s6, and s7 to select itself as a forwarding node for their packets. In the figure, B is the base station and the 
large gray circle is the attacker’s radio range 
 
In this attack, a malicious node acts as a blackhole [23] to attract all the traffic in the network.  
Especially in a flooding based protocol, the attacker listens to the route request and then replies to 
the target node saying that it has a high quality or shortest path to the base station. A victim node 
is thus lured to select it as a forwarder of its packets. Once the malicious device is able to insert 
itself between the communicating entities (between the base station and sensor node), it is able to 
do whatever it wishes with the packets that pass through it. The blackhole (i.e., malicious node or 
the attacker) can drop the packets, selectively forward those to the base station or to the next 
node, or even can change the content of the packets. This type of attack could be very harmful for 
those nodes that are considerably far from the base station. We should keep in mind that 
blackhole attack and sinkhole attack are basically the same attack but these two terms are often 
used interchangeably. As mentioned earlier, this attack can cause DoS in the network and thus 
could be considered as one type of DoS attack. Figure 2 shows a conceptual view of a 
blackhole/sinkhole attack. Some recent works addressing this attack and possible solutions to deal 
with it are [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], and [31]. 
 
3.5. Hello Flood Attack 
 
Hello flood Attack was first detected and introduced by Karlof and Wagnor in [32]. This attack 
uses HELLO packets as a weapon to convince the sensors in the network. Many protocols require 
broadcasting of HELLO packets for neighbor discovery. In this case, a node receiving such a 
packet may assume that it is within (normal) radio range of the sender node. This assumption 
could be exploited by an attacker. An attacker with a large radio transmission range (termed as a 
laptop-class attacker in [32]) and enough processing power can send HELLO packets to a large 
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number of sensors in the network. Thus the sensors could be persuaded that the adversary is their 
neighbor. As a consequence, while sending the information to the base station, the victim nodes 
try to go through the attacker as they know it as their neighbor. In this way the attacker cheats the 
victims. A conceptual picture of hello flood attack is presented in Figure 3. Possible 
countermeasures to handle hello flood attack could be the use of bidirectional verification of links 
before using them, multipath routing, use of multiple base stations [33], or any kind of 
lightweight packet authentication scheme. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Hello flood Attack. A Laptop-class attacker (attacker with large radio range) is transmitting the HELLO 
packets and pretending to be a neighbor of all other legitimate nodes within its radio range  
 
 
3.6. Wormhole Attack 
 
Wormhole attack is a very critical attack in which the attacker records the packets (or bits) at one 
location in the network and tunnels those to another location [34]. The tunneling or 
retransmission of bits could be done selectively. Wormhole attack is a significant threat to 
wireless sensor networks because this is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any 
node, and even if all communications provide authenticity and confidentiality. It could be 
performed even at the initial phase when the sensors start discovering the neighborhood 
information. In a nutshell, attacker’s goal in wormhole attack is to disrupt routing information by 
creating shortcuts in the network.  
 
Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of wormhole attack. In the figure, two adversaries are 
communicating with each other through a direct and dedicated channel by using wired link or 
additional RF (radio-frequency) transceivers with longer transmission range. The route via the 
wormhole looks like an attractive path to the legitimate sensor nodes because it generally offers 
less number of hops and less delay than other normal routing paths. While relaying packets, the 
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adversaries can arbitrarily drop the packets. Therefore data communications through the 
wormhole suffer from severe performance degradation. In a recently published work, Sharif and 
Leckie propose three new variants of wormhole attacks namely Energy Depleting Wormhole 
Attack (EDWA), Indirect Blackhole Attack (IBA), and Targeted Energy Depleting Wormhole 
Attack (TEDWA). Interested readers are suggested to read more in [35]. 
  
 
 
Figure 4: Wormhole attack. Two attackers have created a dedicated tunnel between them and are attracting traffic. 
 
Several works tried to defend against this attack by detection of intruder nodes in the network. 
Some of them are [24], [29], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], and [43]. Other than these 
works, [44] proposes an approach to deal with wormhole attacks using directional antennas, 
which is often not feasible for sensor networks.  
  
So far, we have talked about various security threats and attacks in wireless sensor networks. 
Most of these attacks can be tackled by using proper cryptographic mechanisms. If the node 
authentication method is robust and messages in the network are made illegible to the outside 
entities, many security problems are eventually resolved or just need a little add-on with the 
defense mechanism. For utilizing any kind of cryptographic operation in the network, key 
management is a fundamental issue to deal with. Given the constrained resources of the sensors 
and the special characteristics of wireless sensor networks, key management in WSN is 
considered to be a very challenging topic and a hot research issue. Efficient mechanisms and 
management policies are needed to determine how the keys in such a network would be 
generated, stored, used, manipulated, renewed, or revoked. In the next section, we will try to get 
some insights on these issues. 
 
3.7. Key Management Issues in WSN 
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Primary goal of key management is to set up secure links among the neighboring nodes in the 
network at the formation phase. Some of the major challenges any kind of key management 
mechanism faces are:  
(i) Unknown scalability of the network. It means that if there are n number of nodes 
initially in the network, n´ more nodes could be added to it later. The key management 
scheme must consider the tactics to handle the addition of nodes in the network. 
(ii) Unknown topological distribution of sensors in the network. As the topological 
information of the sensors are often very difficult to obtain and not known in prior in most of 
the cases, the key management scheme must distribute keys or keying information in such a 
way that the neighbor nodes could communicate securely with each other. 
(iii) Limited available resources of the sensors. Like any other mechanism, this is a great 
hurdle that the key management scheme must confront with. 
(iv) What if the nodes in the network are captured by adversaries? The key revocation 
mechanism should ensure that the captured keys cannot be used further in the network and 
still the network should be able to keep functioning with proper level of security. 
(v) Re-keying. If there is any re-keying mechanism in the management scheme, how to 
generate or distribute the new keys among the already deployed sensors in the network? 
 
There are mainly three kinds of approaches for key management in wireless sensor network: 
• Key Pre-Distribution 
• Key Management Based on Public Key 
• Key Management Based on Online Server 
 
3.7.1. Key Pre-Distribution 
 
In case of key pre-distribution schemes, keys or the keying materials are delivered to all sensor 
nodes prior to their deployment. Keying materials are partial information of the keys that could be 
used by the nodes to derive keys for node-to-node secure communications. Among all the key 
management approaches, key pre-distribution seems to be the most feasible solution. This is 
because; most of the operations in this approach can be done prior to the deployment of the 
network.  
 
For key pre-distribution, we mainly consider two phases of operations; initialization phase and 
network formation phase. In the initialization phase, most of the planning and computations are 
done so that the sensors could get relief of the heavy computational burdens. In the formation 
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phase, the sensors establish secure links among themselves based on the pre-stored information in 
their memories.  
 
There are mainly three approaches of key pre-distribution: 
• System key pre-distribution – Same key k is stored in each sensor. k could also be used 
for deriving other keys for secure communications among the sensors. The advantage of 
this approach is the use of little memory to store the key. The drawbacks are little 
resilience and weak authentication.  
• Trivial key pre-distribution – Distinct pairwise keys jik ,  are stored for each pair of 
nodes is  and js . The two nodes contact with each other to derive the pairwise key for 
further secure communications. The advantage of this approach is greater resilience and 
strength of authentication. However, this approach is not scalable and in this case, it is 
hard to handle the addition of new sensors in the network. 
• Random key pre-distribution – In this approach, a number of random keys (say w keys) 
from a key pool is stored in the sensors. Any two nodes in the network may share a key 
with probability p. The advantage of this type of scheme is the resiliency and support for 
addition of new sensors in the network. On the other hand, the drawbacks are the lose 
node authentication and possibility of not finding a common key even among the 
neighboring nodes. One of the legendary works on random key pre-distribution, known 
as the basic scheme was proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [45]. The basic scheme is 
one of the early works which opened the door for further research on various aspects of 
key management in this type of network. 
 
3.7.2. Key Management Based on Public-Key 
 
Public key based schemes use asymmetric keys for encryption and decryption operations. There 
are some well-established public-key based schemes like Diffie-Hellman, Digital Signature 
Standard, ElGamal, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), RSA, etc. [46]. But the reality is, public 
key cryptography (PKC) based schemes are often not directly applicable for wireless sensor 
networks. As mentioned earlier, the limitation of resources of the sensors is the major hurdle for 
using these mechanisms. Also the need for a certificate authority or a trusted middle-man, 
unknown topology of the network, and random deployment of sensors often make their use more 
difficult. In spite of the existence of these barriers, the existing PKC schemes could somehow be 
modified for making them suitable for use in the sensors. Often the number of operations is 
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reduced to make the PKC schemes a bit lightweight. Though in the early days, the researchers 
thought that the PKC schemes are in all the ways inappropriate for WSN, some recent works have 
shown that some lightweight versions of these schemes might be very effective for high-security 
demanding applications. The works like [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], 
[57], and [58] have presented some success stories and gains regarding using public key based 
security mechanisms and key management in WSN. 
 
3.7.3. Key Management Based on Online Server  
 
In this approach, an online server provides the necessary keys to the sensors for communications 
among themselves. The key could be provided by the base station or by the group leaders 
(sometimes called as cluster heads) in the network. However, this approach is not as efficient as 
the key pre-distribution approach as in this case, the special nodes must have relatively more 
memory, processing power, and energy than those of the ordinary sensors in the network. Also, 
the special nodes should be well-dispersed in the network so that they can cover the whole 
network for providing the keys with minimum effort. Maintaining security during the 
transmission of keys also requires some other supporting mechanisms or some trust-based 
approach. Overall, most of the researchers agree that this approach in most of the scenarios, not a 
good solution for managing keys in this type of network. 
 
Some of the recent and notable works on key management in sensor networks are [59], [60], [61], 
[62], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73], [74], [75], [87], and [89]. 
Readers are encouraged to go through these for gaining in-depth knowledge on key management 
in wireless sensor networks. Other than these works, a recent survey on the key management 
schemes in WSN is presented in [76]. 
 
3.8. Secure Routing in WSN 
 
Basically, secure routing is not a separate issue than that we have discussed so far. If we have an 
efficient key management scheme with a supporting security infrastructure, this issue is easily 
solved. In that case, the whole thing reduces to the task of verifying who is communicating with 
whom and through whom. A number of routing protocols are proposed for wireless sensor 
networks (for further reading, [77] and [78] are suggested to the interested readers). However, the 
key point is that most of the routing protocols have overlooked the issue of security at their 
design phase. Sometimes it is quite impossible to fit a good security mechanism with a good 
routing protocol.  
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If the operational method of a routing protocol does not support a particular security mechanism, 
we need to choose any other suitable security approach for that one. In such a case, often the 
suitable security solution might not be the best solution or might not at all help for secure routing 
using that particular protocol. A routing protocol may focus on saving energy resources of the 
sensors, but if a security mechanism is added to it, it might not hold its major point of advantage 
or could even turn into an energy-consuming routing protocol. Therefore, it is better to consider 
the security issues at the design phase of any routing protocol. If the structural design and 
communication methods of the routing protocol allow the security solutions to run side-by-side or 
on top of it, then it could be beneficial for secure routing as well as for handling almost all types 
of threats and attacks in WSN.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that a single solution cannot solve 
all the problems at the same time. Instead, based on the application requirements and network 
settings, the strategy of routing and security should be set. Often we need to consider some trade 
offs among some parameters like security, QoS (Quality of Service), latency, packet loss, etc. 
 
In one of the prominent works on secure routing in wireless sensor networks, Karlof and Wagner 
[32] noted that: 
“One aspect of sensor networks that complicates the design of a secure routing protocol is in-
network aggregation. In more conventional networks, a secure routing protocol is typically 
only required to guarantee message availability. Message integrity, authenticity, and 
confidentiality are handled at a higher layer by an end-to-end security mechanism such as 
SSH or SSL. End-to-end security is possible in more conventional networks because it is 
neither necessary nor desirable for intermediate routers to have access to the content of 
messages. However, in sensor networks, in-network processing makes end-to-end security 
mechanisms harder to deploy because intermediate nodes need direct access to the content of 
the messages. Link layer security mechanisms can help mediate some of the resulting 
vulnerabilities, but it is not enough: we will now require much more from our routing 
protocols, and they must be designed with this in mind.” 
 
In general, for secure routing in wireless sensor networks, the following points could be 
considered: 
• Multipath routing can help for introducing some sort of security. 
• Use of symmetric key cryptography can reduce the processing overhead. 
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• The routing protocols should be intrusion tolerant and should be able to keep on 
functioning at least up to a certain level so that the overall network operations are not 
hampered in case of the presence of intruders. 
• As involvement of security mechanisms can increase the overheads of the protocol, the 
overall design should be kept as simple as possible. 
• Any broken routing path should not hamper the functions of the associated security 
mechanisms. The working method of the protocol should allow finding an alternate path 
to the destination within a minimum interval. 
 
3.9. Physical Security Issues 
 
Earlier we have introduced the types of physical attacks in WSN in brief. In this section, we will 
have a closer look at the physical security issues in wireless sensor networks. We know that the 
sensors in the network could be physically reached by adversaries because of the network’s 
unattended nature. There are several ways to protect a sensor network from the physical attacks. 
 
 The most suitable way to tackle this is the concept of self-destruction. In this case, a 
sensor detects a physical attack and quickly deletes all of its hidden information to 
become non-functional. For a large-scale sensor network, this could be a feasible solution 
as their might be several backups of the sensors’ data, cryptographic keys, codes, and 
other secret information. Also if a part of the network is attacked, the sensors in other 
parts can be ready to destroy themselves before getting captured. Though this sort of self-
destruction mechanism is expensive to incorporate with the sensor’s physical package, it 
is not impossible.  
 An alternate solution could be using a mechanism where each sensor monitors the status 
of its neighboring sensors. Any suspicious behavior or lack of response of a neighbor for 
a certain period of time might trigger a warning. Consequently, the other neighbors can 
get ready for hiding all of their secret information.  
 Analyzing the deployment policy and detailed mapping of the network could also be 
effective for reducing the probability of physical attacks. However, in many applications, 
such kind of thorough study of the deployment area might not be possible. 
 Camouflaging of sensors could be efficient in some deployment scenarios. Say for 
example, a wireless sensor network is to be deployed over a rocky hilly area. In that case, 
the sensors could be colored like rocks or could be given the shapes of rocks (with some 
outer coverings!), which can make the task of physically locating them more difficult. 
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 Sensors might have some sort of protective shields that can save the internal hardware 
from external pressure or from other environmental conditions. 
 
However, applying any of these approaches depends on the deployment budget and requirements 
of the application. Some of the recent works on physical security issues in wireless sensor 
networks can be found in [5], [6], [79], and [80]. 
 
4. CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
With the sophistication of various communication protocols and rapid advancements of Micro-
Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technologies [81], sensors are gaining more resources and 
capabilities with which many barriers of security could be surmounted. In spite of the previous 
advancements and those that are coming in the near future, some issues regarding security in 
WSN could still pose great challenges. In this section, we will talk about those issues and will try 
to visualize the future so that the research works on security in WSN may get a proper direction 
towards devising realistic solutions.  
 
4.1. Holistic Approach to Security in WSN 
 
A holistic approach aims at improving the performance of wireless sensor networks with respect 
to security, longevity, and connectivity under changing environmental conditions. This approach 
of security concerns about involving all the operational layers for ensuring total security in the 
network. When talking about layering concepts, it should be mentioned that the security in 
network layer is mainly concerned about authentication, availability of routing information, and 
integrity of information, the data link layer is concerned mainly about data confidentiality and 
data freshness, and the physical layer is concerned about tamper-resistance. Holistic approach 
tries to lead to a single architecture so that different security mechanisms can work in tandem for 
different layers. Some key principles of holistic approach are: 
• In a given network, the cost for ensuring security should not surpass the assessed security 
risk at a specific time. 
• If there is no physical security ensured for the sensors, the security measures must be able 
to exhibit a graceful degradation, if some of the sensors in the network are compromised, 
out of order, or captured by the enemy. 
• The security measures should be developed to work in a decentralized fashion. 
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Figure 5: Holistic view of security in WSN 
 
Considering all types of security threats and attacks in WSN, we can understand that for this type 
of network, a single security solution for a single layer cannot be considered as a reasonable 
solution. It is better to employ a holistic approach so that all facets of the network could be made 
secure at the same time. As an example, if a WSN has very good security solutions for almost all 
the layers but physically the network is vulnerable, we cannot guarantee that the total security of 
the network is ensured. In such a case, any adversary can go and pick up the sensors from the 
field, extract the cryptographic keys, can use jamming for causing physical layer DoS attacks, 
destroy the sensors, and so on. Though physical security is often not possible to ensure for WSNs, 
at least the overall system must allow a graceful degradation of the network’s operation when it is 
attacked. However, designing and developing such type of efficient security architecture and 
management policy remain as an open challenge. At least we can hope that with the 
advancements of technological capabilities of sensors, this task will become a bit easier in the 
future. 
 
4.2. What to Expect Next? 
 
Today, the limitation of resources of the sensors is considered as the primary obstacle for 
applying robust security mechanisms. In future, this barrier might totally be vanished or might be 
reduced by significant extent. We might see sensors capable of handling even the heavy 
computations associated with public key cryptography schemes (like RSA, SHA-1, etc.) without 
any reduced operation. Say for example, one of the latest advanced wireless sensor platforms, 
Imote2 [82] is built with the low power PXA271 XScale processor at 13-416MHz and it 
integrates an 802.15.4 radio (CC2420) with a built-in 2.4GHz antenna. Imote2 has 256kB SRAM, 
32MB FLASH, and 32MB SDRAM. It is a modular stackable platform and can be expanded with 
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extension boards to customize the system to a specific application. Through the extension board 
connectors, sensor boards can provide specific analog or digital interfaces. A battery board is 
provided to supply system power, or even it can be powered via the integrated USB interface. All 
these features make it a very powerful sensor node compared to its predecessors. The 
rechargeable feature of the sensor’s battery opens the door to overcome the problem of 
constrained and non-renewable energy. Considering today’s achievements, it is reasonable to 
assume that some years later we could even see sensors with much higher configurations with the 
same tiny size! If it becomes true, some interesting questions may arise. What will be the case if 
these tiny devices get the capabilities like high configuration computers? Will we be able to run 
classic security schemes that require heavy computations? If so, will all the works done so far be 
meaningless? The answer to all of these questions is; “No work will be thrown away even if the 
sensors achieve very high configurations”. Basically the researchers have been working on the 
fact that, given such low-configuration devices, how best level of security can be provided for the 
network. Yes, in future the sensors might get more capabilities keeping even today's physical 
size, but even then the devices with current specifications could remain as low-cost alternatives. 
Also, some other tiny devices might have such limited resources. It is also reasonable to think that 
the sensors with current specifications might become much smaller in physical size. If it becomes 
true, in that case, reduction of physical size would ultimately increase the level of physical 
security of these devices. In fact, reduced size of sensors would make them more physically 
secure in the hostile deployment areas as a relatively smaller object is harder to notice! Hence, 
the major point is, no matter how much capabilities a sensor node attains in future, the research 
works done with today’s given limitations (like MICA2’s specifications) will still be useful for 
use for the devices with such capabilities. As a whole, the research area will still remain 
challenging. 
 
In future we might also see wide-spread use of wireless multimedia sensor networks [83], [91] for 
various security applications like; distributed vision, tracking, and monitoring applications.  At 
that time, processing multimedia data might become a little bit easier. However, when issues like 
QoS (Quality of Service) and latency are involved with this, the challenge is likely to remain for 
finding efficient solutions. In fact, ensuring a good level of QoS and a good level of security at 
the same time is always very difficult and often contradictory! Not only for sensor networks but 
also for other types of networks this statement is true. This is because, any sort of security 
operation requires some processing time. If the level of security is increased, the processing delay 
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also increases causing degradation of quality of service. For real-time multimedia applications (if 
at all possible using WSNs or if at all required!), this challenge will remain for a long time. 
 
Some of the recent works show that, in future some applications might need to handle multiple 
types of data within the same network [84]. The development of sensors like ExScal motes [85], 
[86] has already opened the door for further research on heterogeneous applications using 
homogenous multi-purpose nodes. The heterogeneous data generated from such multipurpose 
nodes might have different levels of security based on their priorities. Handling these 
heterogeneous data with different security levels could also be an interesting topic for research in 
the near future. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, we have learnt about security in wireless sensor networks considering five major 
aspects; (i) security approaches for sensor networks, (ii) threats and attacks against sensor 
networks, (iii) key management issues, (iv) secure routing issues, and (v) future possibilities and 
challenges. We have learnt that most of the attacks against security mechanisms in wireless 
sensor network are launched by injecting false information either by compromised nodes residing 
in the network or by attackers. Most of the attacks could be resisted by employing efficient 
schemes to detect the attackers or the compromised nodes. Distributed detection and prevention 
mechanisms can really help to resist lots of attacks. But it is not desired to give the sensors some 
extra tasks than what is necessary. Hence, developing distributed detection and prevention 
schemes still remains as a challenging research issue. 
 
Considering current direction of research and advancements of the methodologies, we can expect 
that in the coming days, ensuring holistic security in wireless sensor network will become a major 
research issue. Many of today’s proposed security mechanisms are based on specific applications, 
network models, or application specific assumptions. Till today there is a lack of proper effort to 
make the security mechanisms operable with one another. If the efficient and lightweight security 
mechanisms for different layers could be made compatible for providing holistic security, it 
would be a great achievement for this research area.  
 
With the increase of innovative applications of wireless sensor networks, the security issue is 
expected to get more emphasis. There is a well-known adage, “An ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure”. If the solutions of other issues are developed keeping security in mind or at least 
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they are made operable with the available security mechanisms, we can expect wide-spread use of 
wireless sensor networks for many security-demanding data extraction applications in the coming 
days.  
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